The article presents the results of the study of young scientists and their role in the functioning of research teams and the academic system. It shows why this topic has not only applied relevance connected with the theoretical justification of science policy but also concerns fundamental issues of philosophy of science. The nature of the structural organization of scientific teams and the scientific community as a whole is discussed. It is argued that science shares with other social institutions a socio-epistemic (...) hierarchy, involving the division of participants into more and less experienced ones, performing certain functions in accordance with the available amount of knowledge and skills. It is shown that this hierarchy is supported by the system of division of labor in science, but does not lead to the formation of a rigid structure, which is reflected in the mismatch of social and cognitive hierarchies of research teams. It is also shown that the contribution of young scientists to the overall scientific result can not only be great due to the appearance of young geniuses. Scientific youth performs a number of cognitive and social functions that are system-forming and are not duplicated at other levels of the scientific hierarchy. These functions may undergo changes depending on the general state of both a separate research area and the scientific system as a whole. This makes the research of scientific youth promising for studying the transformations of science as a social institution and a cultural and historical phenomenon, in particular, for analyzing scientific communications that constitute the scientific community as a collective subject of scientific knowledge, and changes in scientific ethos. (shrink)

The response to the article by O.E. Stolyarova the author shows why the proposed justification for the place of philosophy in the structure of science and technology studies does not work well in relation to the tasks of interdisciplinary communication. It is argued that it is more effective to refer to historical examples and analyze them than to use a purely theoretical explanation of why these examples arise. It is pointed out that, despite the results of postpositivist research of science, (...) the scientific community continues to rely on corporate “common sense”, in which science is seen as positive knowledge and on this basis is opposed to philosophy as a speculative discipline. The necessity of avoiding these ideas in the context of science policy tasks, primarily among scientific managers from among the scientists themselves, is substantiated. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of how production of scientific knowledge transforms nowadays. It is shown that current situation puts forward problem of integration different types of knowledge (not only scientific) – both for producing general meanings, and scientific knowledge. This problem is reflected in several conceptions in the philosophy of science: postacademic science, technoscience, transdisciplinarity. The author pays attention to an idea to be found in these conceptions and some current basic and applied studies; she calls it “the (...) principle of participation”. A few embodiments of this principle are brought out, its conceptual core is revealed, epistemological questions this principle generates in respect to scientific knowledge are defined and some of them are considered in the article: what is a mechanism for aggregating dispersed knowledge? what is the difference between dispersed knowledge and dispersed information? who is the agent of such forms of production of knowledge as Delphi, scientific crowdsourcing, civic science and foresight? Several strategies of knowledge production in modern science (both academic and postacademic) are revealed, two versions of the principle of participation are proposed. (shrink)